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Federal investigation: ‘Systemic weaknesses’ at Grand Canyon contributed to Dragon Bravo Fire

A view of the Dragon Bravo Fire from the South Rim of the Grand Canyon on July 24, 2025.
Lisa Jennings/Southwest Area Incident Management Team
A view of the Dragon Bravo Fire from the South Rim of the Grand Canyon on July 24, 2025.

A cascade of failures by leaders at Grand Canyon National Park, inadequate planning and poor communication led to the 2025 Dragon Bravo Fire’s rapid and destructive growth on the North Rim, according to an investigation by the U.S. Department of the Interior.

The report, published online Friday, states that extreme weather and dry conditions were a factor as the blaze began to grow.

But according to the Significant Wildland Fire Review of the Dragon Bravo Fire, mismanagement by park leaders, and systemic issues within the National Park Service were primarily at fault.

By the time the Dragon Bravo Fire was fully contained in September, almost four months after it was started by lightning, it had grown to more than 145,000 acres, destroyed 114 structures, including the 100-year-old Grand Canyon Lodge, and cost taxpayers more than $141,000,000.

Grand Canyon National Park officials did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

According to the investigation, unclear communication delayed the use of fire retardant by days, and park leaders continued to push a less aggressive firefighting approach even as the blaze began to jump fire lines and threaten the lives of park staff on the North Rim.

The report goes on to point out that park leaders’ mismanagement of the fire put the lives of firefighters, park staff and concessionaires in danger.

It describes harrowing hours on the evening of July 11 as the fire rapidly grew, and how conditions on the ground deteriorated. Personnel on the North Rim were forced to improvise a sudden evacuation without adequate preplanning.

Efforts to fight the fire became uncoordinated throughout that night and at times, firefighters “received little to no tactical direction,” leaving individual personnel to take independent action in an attempt to save structures.

Grand Canyon National Park’s North Rim reopened after last summer's Dragon Bravo Fire. It was the first time visitors witnessed the wildfire's impact, including remnants of the Grand Canyon Lodge.

The 65-page report comes after Interior Department officials conducted more than 70 interviews with federal personnel and outside stakeholders, and reviewed planning documents and communication logs from throughout the fire response.

It proposed nearly 100 policy changes that should be made based on the investigation's findings.

“The Dragon Bravo Fire should be understood as a warning event,” the report reads. “Shaped less by tactical execution than by NPS systemic issues related to authority, qualifications and decision process.”

The report doesn’t assign blame to individual employees. But officials say it’s instead meant to identify policy recommendations and improve the National Park Service’s capacity to handle wildfires.

However, the report found that communication between Grand Canyon National Park Superintendent Ed Keable and firefighters on the ground did not keep pace with the rapidly evolving fire conditions.

And the investigation identified inconsistent strategy and messaging throughout the early days of the Dragon Bravo Fire.

Before the fire blew up, the park managed the blaze with a “confine and contain” strategy, which the report specifies is different from that of a “full suppression” approach.

Even so, park officials would later insist that the fire was managed from the beginning for full suppression.

The “confine and contain” strategy contradicted national guidance from the Interior Department on how parks should approach wildfires throughout 2025.

Contrary to the stated “confine and contain” strategy, firefighters began working to fully suppress the blaze on July 12 after a night of ad hoc evacuations and after some buildings began to burn.

The formal documented strategy on the fire did not change from “confine and contain” to “full suppression” until July 13, more than 48 hours after the Dragon Bravo Fire had begun to rapidly grow and a day after the fire destroyed numerous structures including the Grand Canyon Lodge.

According to the report, poor communication between Keable and firefighters on the ground delayed the use of heavier equipment such as UTVs, and prevented the use of fire retardant on the fire in critical hours before the fire impacted developed areas on the North Rim.

Firefighters requested authorization to use chemical fire retardant on July 11. But the request was communicated to Keable through unofficial channels and he interpreted the request as a consideration for its use in the coming days.

The request was clarified two days later on July 13 and immediately authorized.

A firefighter stands near smoldering debris and active flames amid the charred remains of a burned structure near the Grand Canyon Lodge on the North Rim of Grand Canyon National Park, July 13, 2025.
NPS Photo
A firefighter stands near smoldering debris and active flames amid the charred remains of a burned structure near the Grand Canyon Lodge on the North Rim of Grand Canyon National Park, July 13, 2025.

As new incident commanders took over management of the fire, communication with Keable also remained inconsistent.

For example, the report outlines how a new incident commander preparing to take control of fire management on July 12 was only able to speak to Keable for about 5 minutes.

Additionally, Keable did not have the required training to act as the administrator on the fire. National Park policy states Keable should have attained training to act as a fire administrator within two years of becoming Grand Canyon National Park superintendent in 2020.

By 2025, Keable had not gotten that qualification.

According to the report, the first qualified fire administrator began working the Dragon Bravo Fire on July 30 — nearly a month after it started. Several qualified administrators were locally available but none were called upon.

And the investigation found that Keable was disconnected from the situation on the ground.

According to the report, on July 11 when high winds began to push the blaze over containment lines, Keable attended a meeting in Flagstaff, believing the fire was still growing only slowly.

But Keable hadn’t spoken to the incident commander directly managing the fire and only learned that the fire’s rapid growth had forced evacuations when he returned from Flagstaff.

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